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State v. Copes: Surveillance 
Technology and the Limits of the 
Good Faith Exception to Fourth 
Amendment Violations 
ELISE DESIDERIO* 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, law enforcement officers’ ability to surveil 
citizens has greatly expanded. Audio recording,1 thermal 
imaging,2 and tracking devices3 allow law enforcement 
nearly unfettered access to individuals’ information, 
including real-time locations. These technologies can develop 
at a faster rate than the law adapts to them. Thus, the Fourth 
Amendment implications of some of these technologies is an 
* Elise Desiderio is a Juris Doctor candidate at the University of
Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, Class of 2019, and the
Editor-in-Chief of Volume 14 of the Journal of Business and Technology
Law. She thanks the Journal Executive Board and editorial staff for their
hard work and support, Professor Rena Steinzor for her invaluable and
unwavering mentorship and Professor Danielle Citron for sharing her
passion for and deep understanding of privacy law. Most importantly,
Elise thanks her family for their love and trust.
1 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349 (1967) (evaluating police use of
a recording device placed on top of a phone booth).
2 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (holding that warrantless
use of a thermal imaging device to observe details of a person’s home
violated the Fourth Amendment).
3 State v. Copes, 165 A.3d 418, 447 (Md. 2017) (holding that use of a cell
site simulator to reveal and track the location of a cell phone is protected
by the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary
rule).
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open question.4  
 Present issues implicate law enforcement’s use of cell 
site location information (CSLI) and cell site simulators. 
CSLI provides the historical data available from third-party 
owned and maintained cell towers so law enforcement may 
narrow their search area to phones pinging off of those 
towers.5 Cell site simulators allow law enforcement to mimic 
cell towers to capture and track the precise, real-time 
location of a specific phone.6 The use of cell site simulators is 
controversial, particularly in Baltimore City, Maryland, 
where police have used such devices 4,300 times between 
2007 and 2015.7  
 In July 2017, the Maryland Court of Appeals held in 
State v. Copes8 that while police’s warrantless use of a 
Hailstorm cell site simulator9 to locate a defendant’s cell 
phone may have violated the Fourth Amendment, an 
                                                 
4 See Copes, 165 A.3d at 435 (“Appellate courts have reached different 
conclusions as to whether the warrantless collection of historical CSLI 
implicates the Fourth Amendment.”). 
5 Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. —, slip op. at 11 (2018) (holding 
that law enforcement must generally acquire a warrant to access CSLI 
data). 
6 Justin Fenton, Baltimore Police Used Secret Technology to Track 
Cellphones in Thousands of Cases, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Apr. 9, 2015), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-
stingray-case-20150408-story.html. 
7 Id. 
8 Copes, 165 A.3d at 447 (holding that use of a cell site simulator to reveal 
and track the location of a cell phone is protected by the good faith 
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule). 
9 “Although ‘Stingray’ has become a catch-all name for devices of [this] 
kind, often referred to as ‘IMSI catchers,’” Harris Corporation—the 
company that manufactures and sells most of these devices—sells other 
“surveillance boxes, including the Hailstorm [at issue in Copes], 
ArrowHead, AmberJack, and KingFish.” Sam Biddle, Long-Secret 
Stingray Manuals Detail How Police Can Spy on Phones, THE INTERCEPT, 
Sep. 12, 2016, https://theintercept.com/2016/09/12/long-secret-stingray-
manuals-detail-how-police-can-spy-on-phones/. 
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exception for reasonable law enforcement actions applies to 
that violation.10 Generally, courts exclude information 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment from later 
use as evidence against the accused in the prosecution’s case-
in-chief.11 However, the Supreme Court determined that an 
exception to this exclusionary rule applies where law 
enforcement acted reasonably, or in good faith, including 
when police reasonably rely on a warrant that is later 
determined to be invalid.12 
 The Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Copes is flawed for 
three reasons. First, the court declined to make a definitive 
finding that law enforcement violated Copes’ Fourth 
Amendment rights.13 Second, the court expanded its 
construction of the good faith exception when it found that 
the law enforcement officers acted in good faith in using the 
cell site simulator.14 Finally, the court declined to follow 
soundly reasoned precedent set forth in State v. Andrews, a 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals case largely in synthesis 
                                                 
10 Instead of defining “search” by its plain meaning (to seek out or to find), 
the Supreme Court defines a “search” as a violation of a “subjective 
manifestation of privacy” that “society is willing to accept as reasonable.” 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (J. Harlan, concurring). 
This definition, decided upon after increasingly prevalent use of 
surveillance technologies like voice recorders, has made the job of pinning 
down what a search is under the Fourth Amendment more difficult. See 
generally Id. at 347. 
11 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139–140 (2009) (opining 
that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created doctrine that allows 
courts to exclude evidence obtained through some, but not all, Fourth 
Amendment violations). 
12 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918–919 (1984) (establishing the 
good faith exception by holding that, where police officers acted 
reasonably based on a mistakenly issued warrant, the exclusionary rule 
should not apply because enforcement of the rule would have no deterrent 
effect against future bad acts by law enforcement). 
13 See infra Part II.A.; Copes, 165 A.3d at 431. 
14 See infra Part II.B.; Copes, 165 A.3d at 444. 
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with Copes.15 In Andrews, the court held that warrantless use 
of cell site simulators is generally impermissible.16 The 
flawed reasoning in Copes resulted in a holding that applied 
the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
exclusionary rule too broadly, allowing for unreasonable law 
enforcement activity while also failing to vindicate accused 
persons’ privacy rights. 
 
I. THE CASE 
 
Robert Copes was charged with murder.17 At trial, Copes 
filed a motion to suppress evidence police uncovered using a 
cell site simulator to locate a phone that officers ultimately 
learned belonged to him.18 The police department and the 
company that sells the Hailstorm cell site simulator police 
used to locate the phone had entered into a nondisclosure 
agreement, barring the police department from disclosing its 
use of the Hailstorm.19 The non-disclosure agreement also 
covered officers’ pen register applications to magistrates.20 
                                                 
15 Copes, 165 A.3d at 439 (citing State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324 (Md. App. 
2016)) (affirming a prior decision to suppress evidence gained using a cell 
cite simulator; holding that warrantless use of cell site simulators is 
generally impermissible). 
16 See infra Part II.C.; State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324 (Md. App. 2016). 
17 Copes, 165 A.3d at 429. 
18 Id. 
19 Id.; see also Fenton, supra note 6. 
20 “In simple terms, a pen register records the numbers dialed out from a 
given phone, and a trap and trace device records the numbers that dial 
into that phone. . . [.] When information from both devices is aggregated, 
a log of all incoming and outgoing calls can be created for the period that 
the devices are active. These devices do not capture the content of 
communications. The Fourth Amendment does not require law 
enforcement officers to obtain a search warrant in order to use a pen 
register or trap and trace device.” Copes, 165 A.3d at 424 (citing Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)); see also Pen Register Statute, MD. CODE 
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRO. § 10–4B–01(c)(1) (“‘Pen register’ means a device 
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The trial court granted Copes’ motion to suppress.21 The state 
of Maryland appealed the circuit court’s decision, and the 
Court of Special Appeals affirmed.22 The Court of Appeals 
granted certiorari.23  
The Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special 
Appeals’ decision on three bases. First, the Court of Appeals 
noted that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is 
applicable only when the deterrent effect of applying the rule 
is substantial and outweighs any negative effect to the justice 
system.24 Paramount among these negative effects is the 
notion that “some guilty defendants may go free or receive 
reduced sentences . . . offend[ing] basic concepts of the 
criminal justice system.”25 The exclusionary rule is a 
judicially created doctrine that allows courts to exclude 
evidence obtained through some, but not all, Fourth 
Amendment violations.26 The rule is “designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent 
effect.”27 When evaluating deterrence, “[i]f . . . the 
exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, 
then, clearly, its use . . . is unwarranted.”28  
Second, the Court of Appeals maintained that “the 
exclusionary rule is not applied when law enforcement 
officials engage in ‘objectively reasonable law enforcement 
activity,’ even if that activity is later found to be a violation 
                                                 
or process that records and decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or 
signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from 
which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted.”). 
21 Copes, 165 A.3d at 430. 
22 Id. at 430–431. 
23 Id. at 431. 
24 Id. at 432 (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147 (2009)). 
25 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907–08 (1984). 
26 Herring, 555 U.S. at 139–40. 
27 Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
28 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976). 
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of the Fourth Amendment.”29 Under the facts in Copes, the 
good faith exception’s application is based on “objectively 
reasonable reliance” on a warrant that is found to lack 
probable cause.30 The Copes court found that, although the 
use of the Hailstorm was likely a Fourth Amendment search 
conducted without a warrant,31 the officers’ behavior in using 
a cell site simulator under a pen register order was 
objectively reasonable.32 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals 
reversed the Court of Special Appeals’ decision granting 
Copes’ motion to suppress.33 
Finally, the Copes court found that the pen register 
order the police acquired was functionally the same as a 
warrant for Fourth Amendment purposes.34 The Fourth 
Amendment’s bar against unreasonable searches is 
“generally satisfied when law enforcement officers obtain a 
warrant authorizing the search in question.”35 The Copes 
court found that a pen register order was functionally the 
same as a warrant in part because similar orders, under 
which police officers used cell site simulators in a similar 
way, were approved at least semi-regularly.36 Because the 
officers relied on a mechanism police regularly used before, 
the Court of Appeals found that using a pen register for cell 
site simulators represents objectively reasonable police 
activity such that the good faith exception should apply.37 
                                                 
29 Copes, 165 A.3d at 432 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 919) (establishing a 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule)). 
30 Herring, 555 U.S. at 142 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). 
31 Copes, 165 A.3d at 431. 
32 Id. at 447. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 444. 
35 Id. at 440 (citing Riley v. California, — U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 
(2014)). 
36 Copes, 165 A.3d at 444. 
37 Id. 
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In her dissent, Judge Hotten, joined by Judges Greene 
and Adkins, argued two points: (1) the pen register order was 
not a search warrant or its functional equivalent;38 and (2) 
the good faith exception cannot apply under United States v. 
Leon.39 First, the dissent noted that a “Hailstorm device 
collects far more information than what is authorized by the 
statutory scope of the Maryland Pen Register statute.”40 The 
Hailstorm device scans not only for the target cell phone, but 
also the whole two-block radius surrounding the device.41 
This capability, the dissent posited, is like the thermal 
imaging technology used in Kyllo, for which the Supreme 
Court held law enforcement needed to first acquire a warrant 
before using.42 
Second, the dissent found it “unreasonable for the 
police officers to presume that the Pen Register/Trap [and] 
Trace and Cellular Tracking Device order was sufficient to 
authorize their use of the Hailstorm device.”43 The dissent 
found that the pen register order “was neither represented as 
a warrant when presented to the issuing judge nor did it 
comport with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment 
requiring that a warrant particularly describe the place to be 
                                                 
38 Id. at 447. 
39 Id.; United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1983) (outlining four 
situations in which the good faith exception is inapplicable: where (1) “the 
magistrate . . . in issuing a warrant was misled by information in the 
affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false, 
except for his reckless disregard for the truth[;]” (2) the “magistrate 
wholly abandoned his judicial role[;]” (3) the affidavit is “so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence 
entirely unreasonable[;]” or (4) the warrant is “so facially deficient[, . . .] 
failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized[, 
. . .] that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.”) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted).   
40 Copes, 165 A.3d at 449. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 452. 
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[searched or the technology to be used in conducting the 
search.”44 The dissent’s reasoning and conclusions are sound; 
the following analysis expands upon that reasoning to 
further address the flaws in the Copes majority’s holding. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
While the Copes majority found that police use of a Hailstorm 
cell site simulator was likely a warrantless search under the 
Fourth Amendment,45 the court declined to make a definitive 
finding that the officers infringed upon Copes’ guaranteed 
freedom from unreasonable searches, muddying the waters 
for future defendants. Additionally, the Court of Appeals’ 
decision improperly expanded the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule. In finding that (1) a pen register order is 
likely functionally the same as a warrant,46 and (2) disclosure 
of technological details is not necessary to obtain a valid pen 
register,47 the Copes court applied the good faith exception 
too broadly, such that the exception threatens to eclipse the 
rule. Finally, the Copes court failed to vindicate accused 
persons’ Fourth Amendment rights when it declined to follow 
State v. Andrews,48 a case in synthesis with Copes, where the 
Court of Special Appeals held that the good faith exception is 
generally inapplicable to warrantless use of cell site 
simulators.49 
                                                 
44 Id.  
45 Copes, 165 A.3d at 431. 
46 Id. at 444. 
47 Id. at 446. 
48 State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324 (Md. App. 2016) (affirming a prior 
decision to suppress evidence gained using a cell cite simulator without a 
search warrant). Andrews is a Court of Special Appeals case and is thus 
not binding on the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Special 
Appeals’ holding in Andrews is well-reasoned and thus represents sound 
persuasive authority. 
49 Copes, 165 A.3d at 447. 
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A. Use of a cell site simulator to locate and track 
Copes’ phone constitutes a definitive Fourth 
Amendment violation 
 
The Copes court found that police likely engaged in a 
warrantless search when they used a Hailstorm device to 
locate his phone and, by extension, Copes himself.50 However, 
the court ultimately declined to decide the Fourth 
Amendment question because the United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to hear United States v. Carpenter, 
a case involving warrantless use of CSLI, not cell site 
simulators.51 Articulating its reasoning and referencing 
Carpenter, the Court of Appeals opined: “The Supreme Court 
has reached varying conclusions about the application of [the 
                                                 
50 Id. at 431. 
51 Id. at 447; Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. — (2018). Justice 
Roberts, writing for the majority, recognized the scope of information 
available to law enforcement from third-party service providers, and 
indeed “the progress of science[,] has afforded law enforcement a powerful 
new tool to carry out its important responsibilities. At the same time, this 
tool risks Government encroachment of the sort the Framers [of the 
United States Constitution], after consulting the lessons of history, 
drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent.” Carpenter, 585 U.S. —, slip 
op. at 22. 
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principles laid out in Katz52 and Kyllo53] to the use of location 
tracking devices, and has recently agreed to consider such an 
issue related to cell phones.”54   
 The Court of Appeals’ reasoning in its decision to defer 
addressing the Fourth Amendment question is flawed for two 
reasons. First, the technology at issue in Carpenter does not 
yield results as precise as that used in Copes, rendering the 
Fourth Amendment implications of those technologies not 
comparable.55 Second, even considering Supreme Court 
precedent pre-Carpenter, the Court of Appeals should have 
found that warrantless use of cell site simulators definitively 
violated the Fourth Amendment, irrespective of the Supreme 
Court’s then-pending decision in Carpenter.56 The Copes 
holding may create instability for future defendants about 
the suppression of evidence. Such instability then results in 
a strategic disadvantage to defendants as they move through 
the criminal justice system. 
                                                 
52 In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 351 (1967). The Katz Court held that Federal Bureau of 
Investigation officials violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment right 
against unreasonable search when they placed a listening device on top 
of a public telephone booth to record a defendant’s end of a phone 
conversation. Id. at 354. Though a phone booth is not a constitutionally 
protected place, because the defendant entered the booth and closed the 
door before speaking on the phone, the Court found that recording the 
defendant’s end of the conversation from atop the booth was a violation 
of his Fourth Amendment protections. Id. Society is willing to accept that 
when a person enters a phone booth and closes the door, that person 
reasonably expects further conversation inside the booth to be private. Id. 
at 359. 
53 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (holding that warrantless use of surveillance 
technology violates the Fourth Amendment if law enforcement (1) uses 
technology not in public use (2) to observe details of a private home (3) in 
a way that would be otherwise impossible without physical intrusion). 
54 Copes, 165 A.3d at 433–434. 
55 See infra Part II.A.i. 
56 See infra Part II.A.ii. 
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1. The Court of Appeals’ decision conflated CSLI 
and cell site simulators 
 
At issue in Carpenter was law enforcement’s warrantless 
acquisition of cell site location information (CSLI).57 The 
Copes court noted that other courts held that accessing CSLI 
data was not a Fourth Amendment search.58 The court also 
noted that many courts considering CSLI cases cited the 
“third party doctrine,”59 which the Supreme Court 
established when it concluded that “law enforcement officers 
do not conduct a search for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment when they request a telephone company to 
install a pen register60 or obtain a depositor’s bank records61 
from a financial institution.”62 Finding general points of 
synthesis between CSLI usage and reliance on pen registers, 
the Copes court declined to decide whether a Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred when officers used a cell site 
simulator while executing a pen register order.63 
                                                 
57 Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. –––, slip op. at 11 (2018) (holding 
that warrantless acquisition of CSLI does not fall under the good faith 
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule). 
58 Copes, 165 A.3d at 435. 
59 Id. at 436; United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427–28 (2016) (en 
banc) (holding that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy regarding her cell phone's CSLI because a cell phone user 
voluntarily shares that information with her service provider whenever 
she uses the phone to call or text), abrogated by Carpenter v. United 
States, 585 U.S. — (2018). 
60 See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that use 
of a pen register is not a search under the Fourth Amendment because 
individuals share the numbers they dial with their service providers). 
61 See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that 
obtaining a depositor’s bank records is not a search because the depositor 
shares those records with the bank). 
62 Copes, 165 A.3d at 435. 
63 Id. at 439. 
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 However, in Carpenter, the Court held that “a warrant 
is required in the rare case where the suspect has a 
legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party,”64 
and further found that suspects have legitimate privacy 
interests in their CSLI records because those records are part 
of an individual’s “papers” or “effects.”65 
Even if the third-party doctrine covered CSLI data, 
CSLI and cell site simulators are not the same or comparable 
mechanisms, nor do they provide the same or comparable 
information.66 Cell site simulators allow for more precise 
location targeting than CSLI and allow law enforcement to 
acquire data on their own, without relying on a third party.67 
CSLI provides data available from a third-party cell tower so 
law enforcement may narrow their search area.68 Conversely, 
a cell site simulator allows law enforcement to simulate a cell 
tower and capture and track the precise location of a specific 
phone.69 Because of their nature, capabilities, and 
invasiveness, cell site simulators are not equivalent to CSLI, 
and thus neither are their Fourth Amendment implications. 
 
                                                 
64 Carpenter, 585 U.S. –––, slip op. at 21. 
65 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
66 When the Sixth Circuit decided Carpenter, the court noted “the 
distinction between GPS tracking and CSLI acquisition,” writing that 
“CSLI does appear to provide significantly less precise information about 
a person’s whereabouts than GPS and, consequently, [the court agrees] 
that a person’s privacy interest in the CSLI his or her cell phone 
generates may indeed be lesser.” United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 
880, 894 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d by Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. — 
(2018) (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a 
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”)). 
67 See infra note 84. 
68 Carpenter, 585 U.S. —, slip op. at 2 (2018). 
69 See Fenton, supra note 6. 
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2. Supreme Court precedent supports a definitive 
finding that warrantless use of cell site 
simulators violates individuals’ Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable 
searches 
 
Supreme Court precedent, set in Kyllo v. United States, 
supports a holding that the warrantless use of surveillance 
technology violates the Fourth Amendment when law 
enforcement (1) uses technology not in public use; (2) to 
observe details of a private home; (3) in a way that would be 
otherwise impossible without physical intrusion.70 Use of the 
cell site simulator, at issue in Copes, satisfies all three factors 
required under Kyllo.71  
 First, the officers relied on a surveillance method not 
in public use.72 Cell site simulators sold by Harris 
Corporation are only available to police departments and 
federal agencies; systems may cost $27,800, excluding 
software and accessories.73 Second, the officers observed 
details of a private home, namely Copes’ real-time location 
within his apartment.74 Finally, the officers observed those 
details in a manner that would have been otherwise 
impossible without physical intrusion.75 The officers could 
not have located the defendant within the building without 
physical intrusion of that building.76 Instead of physically 
intruding, the officers located the building by intercepting a 
                                                 
70 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Curtis Waltman, Here’s How Much a StingRay Cell Phone Surveillance 
Tool Costs, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Dec. 8, 2016), https://motherboard.vice. 
com/en_us/article/gv5k3x/heres-how-much-a-stingray-cell-phone-
surveillance-tool-costs. 
74 Copes, 165 A.3d at 421. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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cell phone signal to find the phone’s precise location inside 
the building.77 Thus, warrantless use of a cell site simulator 
to precisely locate Copes’ phone—and, by extension, Copes 
himself—violated Copes’ Fourth Amendment protections 
under Kyllo.78 
 
B. The Court of Appeals erroneously applied the 
good faith exception 
 
The Copes court found that it was not clear to the detectives 
that the use of a pen register to employ a cell site simulator 
failed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement.79 In so finding, the Court of Appeals relied on 
testimony from “Detective Kershaw, [who stated that] 
applications for similar orders had been approved ‘many, 
many times,’ and never denied.”80 Because of law 
enforcement’s prior reliance on these pen register orders, the 
Copes court found that law enforcement acted reasonably.81 
The court found that the officers’ actions were reasonable 
independent of whether (1) pen register orders were a valid 
basis on which to surveil using a Hailstorm device; and (2) 
the magistrate approving the order was aware that police 
planned to use a Hailstorm device.82 
 The Supreme Court in United States v. Leon described 
four situations in which the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule does not apply.83 These situations are as 
follows: 
 
                                                 
77 Id. 
78 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33. 
79 Copes, 165 A.3d at 444. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 447. 
82 Id. at 444, 446. 
83 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 
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(1) the magistrate is misled by information in 
the application for the warrant that the officer 
knew was false or would have known was 
false, except for a reckless disregard for the 
truth; (2) the magistrate wholly abandons a 
detached and neutral role; (3) the affidavit is 
so lacking in probable cause so [as] to render 
official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable; (4) the warrant is so facially 
deficient, by failing to particularize the place 
to be searched or the things to be seized, that 
the executing officers cannot reasonably 
presume it to be valid.84 
 
First, a pen register order is not comparable to a warrant in 
form or function.85 The good faith exception, as applied to the 
facts in Copes, requires officers’ reasonable reliance on an 
invalid warrant or what the officers reasonably believed to be 
its functional equivalent;86 therefore, the good faith exception 
should not apply to officers’ reliance on a pen register order 
in Copes. Second, even if the pen register order were 
considered functionally equivalent to a warrant, the facts in 
Copes speak to the first situation under Leon, rendering the 
good faith exception inapplicable for misleading an issuing 
magistrate, by omitting the planned use of a cell site 
simulator.87 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
84 Copes, 165 A.3d at 433 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). 
85 See infra Part II.B.i. 
86 Id. 
87 See infra Part II.B.ii. 
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1. The good faith exception requires reasonable 
reliance on a warrant that is later found invalid; 
pen register orders are not functionally 
equivalent to warrants 
 
A pen register order is not a warrant,88 nor is a pen register 
order functionally the same as a warrant.89 A pen register 
“records the numbers dialed out from a given phone,” while 
related technology known as a “trap and trace device records 
the numbers that dial into that phone.”90 Importantly, a pen 
register order is easier for law enforcement to acquire than a 
search warrant. An application for a pen register order 
requires:  
                                                 
88 Use of a pen register alone is not a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment, as the Supreme Court noted in Smith v. Maryland. Smith 
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–746 (1979). However, contemporary 
technology allows for the gathering of far more information, in real-time, 
than the phone numbers dialed out that officers acquired in Smith. Id.; 
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. —, slip op. at 11 (declining to extend 
Smith to include CLSI). Moreover, precedent suggests that pen register 
orders have limits. The Supreme Court in Riley v. California “reject[ed] 
the . . . suggesting that officers should always be able to search a phone’s 
call log.” Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014) (holding that officers could 
not go through the call logs of a suspect’s cell phone without a warrant). 
A pen register may have, in its earlier uses, been a way to access call logs, 
as in Smith, but in Copes, officers used the same type of order to not only 
record phone numbers dialed in and out from a cell phone, but the real-
time, “fairly accurate estimate of the target phone’s location.” Copes, 165 
A.3d at 423. See also Copes, 165 A.3d at 423 n.12 (“It also may be possible 
to configure particular cell site simulators to intercept data or 
communications. See generally S. K. Pell & C. Soghoian, A Lot More Than 
a Pen Register, and a Lot Less Than a Wiretap: What the StingRay 
Teaches Us About How Congress Should Approach the Reform of Law 
Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 134, 146 
(2013). According to testimony at the hearing in this case, the cell site 
simulator used in this case did not have that capability.”). 
89 Copes, 165 A.3d at 440. 
90 Id. at 424.  
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(1) The identity of the State law enforcement 
or investigative officer making the application 
and the identity of the law enforcement agency 
conducting the investigation; and  
(2) [A] statement under oath by the applicant 
that the information likely to be obtained is 
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation 
being conducted by that agency.91 
 
A search warrant application, in contrast, requires law 
enforcement to provide a sworn affidavit stating that “there 
is probable cause to believe” either a crime is being 
committed within the issuing judge’s jurisdiction or “property 
subject to seizure under the criminal laws of the State is on 
the person or in or on the building apartment, premises, 
place, or thing.”92 Because a pen register application is less 
stringent than a search warrant petition, officers need not be 
as certain about the nature or specificity of the information 
they anticipate uncovering through surveillance executed 
under a pen register.93 
 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently 
considered the question of whether the good faith exception 
applies when officers use a cell site simulator without a 
warrant, and held that the good faith exception is 
inapplicable in such cases.94 Jones v. United States, decided 
September 21, 2017, is a crucial holding from an influential 
court rejecting application of a good faith exception in 
warrantless cell site simulator cases.95 The Jones court 
rejected assertions that the Copes court accepted, namely 
that (1) “at the time of [the] incident, no court had held that 
                                                 
91 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRO. § 10-4B-03. 
92 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PRO. § 1-203(a)(1). 
93 Id. 
94 See Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 707 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017). 
95 Id. 
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using a simulator to locate a phone violated the Fourth 
Amendment,” and (2) applying the exclusionary rule “would 
not meaningfully deter police misconduct.”96  
 While the Jones court recognized that the Supreme 
Court upheld the good faith exception when officers 
reasonably believed a warrant was valid, the Jones court 
found that the police, “not acting pursuant to a seemingly 
valid warrant, statute, or court opinion, conducted an 
unlawful search using a secret technology that they had 
shielded from judicial oversight and public scrutiny.”97 
Though Jones was decided several months after Copes, the 
Jones holding highlighted the deficiencies in the Court of 
Appeals’ decision to consider a pen register as the functional 
equivalent of a warrant. 
 
2. Misleading the issuing magistrate through 
omission of information disclosed in a pen 
register order precludes applicability of the good 
faith exception 
 
Even if a pen register order were functionally the same as a 
warrant, the good faith exception remains inapplicable 
because the officers in Copes failed to disclose their planned 
use of a Hailstorm device when applying for that order.98 The 
Jones court made a similar determination, finding that 
“assuming the police believed the warrantless use of the [cell 
site] simulator to be lawful, they could not have reasonably 
relied on that belief, given the secrecy surrounding the 
device.”99 The circumstances at play in Copes and Jones, 
where law enforcement officers were precluded from 
disclosing cell site simulator use in applications to the 
                                                 
96 Id. at 719 (internal quotations omitted). 
97 Id. at 720. 
98 Copes, 165 A.3d at 429. 
99 Jones, 168 A.3d at 720. 
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court,100 mirror the first circumstance in which the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule is inapplicable under Leon: 
where “the magistrate is misled by information in the 
application for the warrant that the officer knew was false or 
would have known was false, except for a reckless disregard 
for the truth.”101 In Copes, as in Jones, law enforcement 
“shielded” “secret technology” from both “judicial oversight 
and public opinion.”102  
 The Copes court acknowledged that the officers “failed 
to go into greater detail about [the] technology” the officers 
planned to use, but ultimately found that “search warrants 
need not ‘include a specification of the precise manner in 
which they are to be executed.’”103 The Court of Appeals 
relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in Dalia v. United 
States that law enforcement officers need not enumerate in 
precise detail the officers’ intended surveillance method, even 
in a warrant application.104 The Copes court reasoned that 
Dalia allowed for a certain level of nondisclosure: “the 
absence of greater detail does not render the order that was 
issued so fatally deficient that the detectives could not 
execute it in good faith.”105 The Copes court held that “the 
application and order clearly inform a reasonably diligent 
reader of what the officers seek to do and how they plan to do 
it (even if they do not describe the technical details).”106 
                                                 
100 Copes, 165 A.3d at 446; Jones, 168 A.3d at 719. 
101 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 
102 Jones, 168 A.3d at 720. 
103 Copes, 165 A.3d at 446 (quoting Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 
257 (1979) (holding that under the Fourth Amendment, search warrants 
need not “include a specification of the precise manner in which they are 
to be executed”). 
104 Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979). 
105 Copes, 165 A.3d at 446–447. 
106 Id. at 446 (emphasis added). 
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 However, these “technical details”107 are the thrust of 
the issue in Copes, and failing to disclose those details 
amounts to “[misleading the magistrate] by information in 
the application for the warrant that the officer knew was 
false or would have known was false” under Leon.108 If the 
technical details in question may affect the issuing judge’s 
analysis of the reasonableness of the order under the Fourth 
Amendment,109 then absence of those details may mislead 
the issuing magistrate and render the order “fatally 
deficient.”110  
 When applying for a warrant, the Fourth Amendment 
requires law enforcement to state the “place to be 
searched.”111 In Copes, that “place” was the location of Copes’ 
cell phone. Even the less stringent pen register order 
application requires a “statement under oath by the 
applicant that the information likely to be obtained is 
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being 
conducted by that agency.”112 Again, in Copes, the 
                                                 
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 433 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). 
109 “For an issuing judge to appreciate the gravity of the exercise of the 
requirements and parameters of the Fourth Amendment and any 
intrusion on a person's privacy rights, the issuing judge must appreciate 
the scope and manner of the search proposed to be conducted. The more 
an issuing judge understands the technology associated with the device 
sought to be used, the better the issuing judge can appreciate the 
constitutional impact of the search request, particularly when the device 
has the capacity to conduct a very broad, intrusive search impacting the 
Fourth Amendment. As the Court of Special Appeals eloquently stated, 
‘[t]he analytical framework requires analysis of the functionality of the 
surveillance device and the range of information potentially revealed by 
its use.’” Copes, 165 A.3d at 447 (JJ. Hotten, Greene, and Adkins, 
dissenting) (quoting Andrews, 134 A.3d at 338). 
110 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. But see Copes, 165 A.3d at 447 (“the absence of 
greater detail does not render the order that was issued so fatally 
deficient that the detectives could not execute it in good faith.”). 
111 U.S. CONST., amend. IV. 
112 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRO. § 10-4B-03(b)(2). 
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“information likely to be obtained” is the location of the cell 
phone.113  
 Significantly, however, depending on the technology 
used—CSLI or cell site simulator—“location” has two 
discrete meanings: approximate location and precise location. 
A traditional pen register (and related technology, the trap 
and trace), uses information gathered from a third-party 
service provider to generate a list of various signals 
transmitted to and from a specific phone.114 Using a pen 
register order to access CSLI, at issue in Carpenter, is a way 
to determine a cell phone’s approximate location by 
triangulating the radial range of the existing cell phone 
towers from which the phone derives its communicative 
capability.115  
 Conversely, a cell site simulator, at issue in Copes, is 
a device with which law enforcement officers may simulate a 
cell phone tower themselves.116 Therefore, law enforcement 
does not use information from existing cell towers to capture 
a specific phone number to immediately identify the precise 
location of the phone associated with that number.117 Using 
a cell site simulator achieves a more specific result than 
relying on a traditional pen register or CSLI. As such, the 
location results—the “place to be searched” under the Fourth 
Amendment—when using a cell site simulator rather than 
CSLI are qualitatively different.118 Thus, failing to disclose 
planned use of a cell site simulator when applying for a pen 
register order may have substantial effects on the issuing 
judge’s reasonableness analysis.119 In failing to disclose, law 
                                                 
113 Id. 
114 18 U.S.C. §§ 3127(3), 3127(4) (2012). 
115 Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. —, slip op. at 2 (2018). 
116 See Fenton, supra note 6. 
117 Id.  
118 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
119 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 
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enforcement puts a thumb on the scale in its favor in a way 
that should render a resulting pen register order invalid 
under Leon.120 
The officers in Copes did not mention their planned use 
of a cell-site simulator in their application for a pen register 
order because a nondisclosure agreement between 
Hailstorm’s manufacturer and the Baltimore Police 
Department bound those officers to silence on the subject, 
even to judges.121 This failure to disclose the use of a cell-site 
simulator is evidence of “reckless disregard for the truth” 
about the technology’s uses and capabilities.122 The 
“technical details”123 of a Hailstorm device are qualitatively 
different and more advanced than other means by which law 
enforcement may “initiate a signal to determine the location 
of the subject’s mobile phone.”124 For example, a Hailstorm 
device can remotely make a targeted phone ring.125 These 
crucial distinctions (1) affect the efficacy and quality of the 
information gathered; and (2) may affect an issuing judge’s 
analysis. Thus, allowing for a good faith exception to the 
Fourth Amendment violation in Copes was inappropriate.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
120 Id. 
121 Copes, 165 A.3d at 452. See also Fenton, supra note 6; Ernest Reith, 
Letter to Police Commissioner Bealefeld and State’s Attorney Bernstein, 
Purchase Wireless Collection Equipment/Technology and Non-Disclosure 
Obligation, Federal Bureau of Investigation (July 13, 2011), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/bal-police-stingray-non-disclosure-
agreement-20150408-htmlstory.html.  
122 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 
123 Copes, 165 A.3d at 446. 
124 Id. 
125 See Fenton, supra note 6.  
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C. The Court of Appeals should have employed the 
rational precedent set forth in Andrews 
 
Despite its finding that Copes’ Fourth Amendment rights 
were likely violated, the Court of Appeals declined to apply 
State v. Andrews.126 Andrews is a Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals case that involved the precise type of surveillance 
technology that law enforcement utilized in Copes.127 The 
facts in Copes and Andrews related to law enforcement’s 
behavior are largely in synthesis.128 The law enforcement 
officers in Andrews were subject to a nondisclosure 
agreement between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
the State’s Attorney’s Office.129 Police officers in Copes were 
also bound not to disclose use of the Hailstorm device in pen 
register applications.130 The Copes court noted that “[w]ith 
respect to the nondisclosure agreement . . . the testimony at 
the hearing in this case was that the detectives would have 
answered any questions of the issuing judge about what they 
                                                 
126 State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 327 (Md. App. 2016) (affirming a prior 
decision to suppress evidence gained using a cell cite simulator). 
127 Id. 
128 Copes, 165 A.3d at 438 (“In Andrews, the defendant had been charged 
with first-degree murder related to a shooting during an illicit drug 
transaction. A warrant was issued for his arrest, but police were initially 
unable to locate him. Officers learned the number of the defendant's cell 
phone through a confidential informant. The officers applied for—and 
obtained—a court order based in part on the Pen Register Statute, similar 
to the order in this case. Using a cell site simulator, officers were able to 
locate the cell phone—and the defendant—at a home in Baltimore. They 
arrested the defendant and then obtained a search warrant for the home 
where they found a gun in the cushions of the couch where the defendant 
had been sitting. The circuit court granted the defendant's motion to 
suppress the gun and other evidence as fruits of an illegal search—i.e., 
the use of the cell site simulator without a search warrant.”) (citing 
Andrews, 134 A.3d at 327-29). 
129 Id. at 446. 
130 See Fenton, supra note 6. 
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planned to do.”131 Because officers would have answered 
questions about the Hailstorm device were they asked about 
that device, the Copes court found no bad faith.132 
 The Copes court correctly pointed out that Andrews 
cites United States v. Graham, a case that the Fourth Circuit 
overruled en banc.133 Upon re-hearing, the full Fourth Circuit 
panel in Graham held that acquisition of CSLI without a 
warrant is covered by the good faith exception.134 However, 
the type and specificity of the location information gathered 
sufficiently distinguish CSLI and cell site simulators.135 As 
CSLI and cell site simulators are distinguishable, so too are 
the situations in Graham, Andrews, and later Copes. 
Moreover, Graham has been abrogated by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Carpenter, holding that law enforcement 
must obtain a warrant before acquiring CSLI data.136 
 Finally, the Copes court’s assertion that “the 
detectives would have answered any questions of the issuing 
judge about what they planned to do”137 unreasonably 
stretches the Leon Court’s rule against misleading a 
magistrate.138 The Copes court found that so long as officers 
are willing to answer an issuing judge’s questions, those 
officers did not mislead that judge by omitting details.139 
However, the officers in Copes withheld highly pertinent 
                                                 
131 Copes, 165 A.3d at 446. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 439; see also United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 
2015), reh’g en banc granted by United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 
(4th Cir. 2016), abrogated by Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. — 
(2018). 
134 United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc 
granted by United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016), 
abrogated by Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. — (2018). 
135 See supra Part II.B.ii. 
136 Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. —, slip op. at 21 (2018). 
137 Copes, 165 A.3d at 446. 
138 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 
139 Copes, 165 A.3d at 446. 
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information from the issuing judge when applying for a pen 
register order, specifically, the crucial information regarding 
how the officers planned to execute their surveillance.140 
Finding that law enforcement’s later willingness to answer 
questions negated any bad faith expressed by withholding 
information from the magistrate unreasonably stretches the 
factors in Leon,141 transferring law enforcement’s burden to 
issuing judges. Such a finding effectively requires judges to 
proactively ask officers questions about the very technology 
those officers omit from their pen register orders. Judges, 
then, may not be aware of what questions to ask, precisely 
because officers withhold their use of Hailstorm devices. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Conflation of the nature and function of related but distinct 
emerging technologies, particularly when used by law 
enforcement, is a misapplication of facts to relevant law that 
can result in injustice, as in Copes. The good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule should be construed narrowly, 
particularly when the use and disclosure of details of 
surveillance technology are involved. A narrow construction 
of the good faith exception allows for more effective 
preservation of privacy rights in the twenty-first century.  
                                                 
140 Id. 
141 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 
